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Witnesses: A Canonist's View
by WILLIAM HAMILTON BRYSON *

regarding the history of equity proceT
dure is that it came through chancery from the medieval ecclesiastical courts. The connection between the English high court
HE PREVAILING OPINI.ON

of chancery and the courts Christian is due to .the practice of the
medieval English kings of recruiting their chief advisers, the chancellors, from the ranks of the native episcopacy. As the secular
chancery developed its court, the chancellor quite naturally adopted
those procedures which were most familiar to him, which were
those of his own consistory. Also many of the bishops who became
chancellors had studied civil (Roman) law and canon law in the
universities, but few had had much professional contact with the
cruder procedures of the common law courts. Thus the situation
of the court is a unique substance of lay justice administered by
means of a procedure which is basically ecclesiastical, the Romanocanonical procedure.
The purpose of this essay is to examine and compare with our
present practices a medieval text or summary of canonical procedure, the Summa de Ordine /udiciario by Ricardus Anglicus-more
narrowly, chapter XXX, which is concerned with witnesses. There
are several reasons for examining the work of Ricardus Anglicus.
This Englishman was a brilliant canonist in an age when the most
ingenious and aggressive intellectuals were gravitating to the field
of canon and civil law. Also he gives us a rather full summary of
the subject.
Ricardus Anglicus has definitely been identified as Richard of
Mores who was born in Lincolnshire in the second half of the
twelfth century and who died in 1242. We find him first mentioned
as being in Paris around 1186, 1187. It is probable that he went
from there back to England to the University at Oxford. He was
in Bologna during the pontificate of Celestine III (1191-1198) where
he was a student and then a well-known and highly regarded professor of canon law; in fact he was one of the first English canonists at Bologna. By 1198 he was back again in England, and during the years 1198 through 1202 he was in professional association
• Research Student, Christ's College,
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with Hubert Walter, the archbishop of Canterbury and chancellor
of England. 1 He was a canon of Merton, and in 1202 he was elected
prior of the monastery at Dunstable. Ricardus left the court of
the archbishop at this . time but continued to be active in public
administration. He went several times to Rome: in 1203 on behalf
of King John and in 1216 to attend the Fourth Lateran Council.
Nevertheless he remained always an academician at heart. 2
The Summa de ordine iudicia1·io was written in 1196 in Bologna.
This work was immediately successful and was well known in western Europe. However, it was soon superceded; it was antiquated
by the end of the thirteenth century and generally forgotten. It
is not incautious to assume that Ricardus had a copy with him when
he was in the service of Hubert Walter and that his patron and
his colleagues, the vice-chancellors, were familiar with it. 3
Ricardus' summa is not a well-structured treatise, but rather
it is a collection of well chosen quotations similar to the Corpus
Juris Civilis of Justinian, upon which it so heavily relies. In the
section on witnesses, every single paragraph is taken from the works
of another; however, every thought is properly cited as being that
of another with one exception in which the citation precedes the
quotation by several pages. The only original words of Ricardus
in this section are the introductions .to the quotations, but even
here the substance is not original. The quotations which comprise
this section were taken from three sources: Justinian, Gratian,
and Bernard of Pavia. The sections of the Corpus Juris Civilis
used primarily are the three sections entitled "de testibus" ("witnesses"), i.e. Digest, XXII. 5; Code, IV. 20; and Novel 90. In fact,
the quotations from these three sections make up about seventy-five
percent of the total chapter; this is to be expected since the ecclesiastical procedure was closely derived from the Roman model. Six
of the seven citations to Gratian are to the second part, causa III,
1 C. E. Lewis, "Ricardus Anglicus, A 'Familiaris' of Archbishop
Hubert Walter," 22 Traditio 469-471 (1966).
2 S. Kuttner, Dictionnaire de droit canonique, vol. 7, col's. 676-681;
S. Kuttner and E. Rathbone, "Anglo-Norman Canonists of the Twelfth
Century," 7 Traditio 279, 327-339 (1949-1951); L. Wahrmund, Quellen
zur Geschichte des Romisch-Kanonischen Prozesses im Mittelalter, vol. 2,
part 3 (1915).
3 Campbell is of the opinion that Walter did not attend to the duties
of chancellor himself since he constantly employed vice-chancellors. 1 Lives
of the Chancellors 116-118 (7th ed., 1885). However, it is not known what
their duties were; it could be that Campbell's view is anachronistic.
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of his Decretum. Four of the five references to the Compilatio
Prima (1192) of Bernard of Pavia are to book II, title 13. This
summa is nevertheless a very helpful work for us and was for the
medieval practitioners and judges also. We have much more than
a mere form book; it is a summary of the law.
The arrangement of ideas within Ricardus' work is somewhat
haphazard, and so I will discuss them in an order which seems to
me to be easier to follow. I have divided the material into three
parts: competency, mode of examination, and substance of examination.
The competency of witnesses was determined by the judge.
The criteria for this determination were designed to exclude those
who would be most likely to commit perjury for various reasons.
The language of this section seems to indicate that there was to
have been a voir dire, because the judge was to allow a witness
to testify only if he was satisfied that he would not perjure himself. The most important, certainly the most emphasized, criterion
was integrity and good reputation; truthfulness in the past should
be a fair indication of veracity in the future. Also the social status
or rank of the proposed witness should be considered; the upper
classes would be better educated and more conscious of the duty
to testify truthfully. The wealthy witness was to be preferred over
the poor one since the temptation to swear falsely for money would
be less. Friendship, moreover; with one of the parties was to be
noted, as was enmity towards the opposite party. And in addition
the judge should observe the manner, bearing-shifty-eyes, sweaty
palms, nervous fidgeting-and general behavior of the witness. This
seems to be an attempt to exclude from court those who will detract
from the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings by ill manners
as well as by false testimony. Furthermore, those who hesitate in
answering or give contradicting answers should be rejected.
The above-mentioned criteria are matters within the discretion of the judge However, there are several classes of persons
who are legally prohibited from testifying. Neither a freedman nor
his immediate family nor his spouse can testify against his former
master or his patron or vice versa. This is the privilege of the
party; note also that the freedman can testify on behalf of his
patron. Slaves are completely incompetent to testify. If a proposed
witness is asserted to be in servitude, then his evidence will be
taken and then, if it can be proved that he is free, his evidence can
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be used, if not it will be quashed. This disqualification of slaves
was copied from the Roman law to refer to serfs or villeins. 4
The disability of foreigners and unknown persons seems to
reflect a natural distrust of strangers. It is consistent with the
above-mentioned preference for witnesses with good reputations,
for these persons have no reputation at all.
As to family and depen~ents of the adversary party, there
seems to be a conflict in the rules. At one place these persons seem
to be allowed to testify against their kin and master, only if they so
desire (and dare). But two paragraphs later they seem to be absolutely prohibited from testifying at all. The purposes of these two
paragraphs, however, are not in conflict; the purpose of the second
is to protect the outsider from the bias of witnesses who are kin
to or under the control of the other party. This purpose is not frustrated nor is the outsider at all prejudiced by the voluntary testimony
of the relatives of the adversary party against said adversary. The
purpose of the first is to protect the integrity of the family by not
allowing a stranger to turn one member against another and to encourage familial closeness by protecting shared confidences.
In regard to the disability of witnesses who are "under suspicion," "unfriendly," "not of good behavior," etc., it need only be
pointed out that these conditions are so vague that each case must
be entirely in the discretion of the judge, and thus we have only a
repetition of the rules of competence discussed above.
Finally, if a witness is produced who has at the same time a
lawsuit pending with the other party, this party may object if the
witness holds an enmity towards him because of said pending litigation. If the suit with the witness is of a criminal nature, then
his testimony cannot be taken until after the said suit is terminated.
If it is a civil case, then the testimony of the witness will be taken,
but it cannot be used until after the litigation with the witness
has ended. This rule is based on the premise that the witness is
liable to commit perjury out of malice for the party who also has
a suit against him, but that, after the suit is ended, the witness's
antagonism will abate. This rationale, however, does not explain
why, in the case of a civil suit between the witness and party, the
witness can give his testimony but it cannot be used until after that
suit is ended. The Romans and the canon lawyers recognized the
4 In England at this time only free persons could appear in the common law courts as witnesses, whether a champion: Glanvill II, 3; or a
compurgator: Glanvill V, 6; or member of a grand assize: Glanvill II, 11
and IX, 7; or a petite assize:· Glanvill XIII, 3, 4, 7, etc.
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greater dangers of criminal prosecutions; here may be the key to
the answer. Perhaps the witness would attempt to injure and
harass by means of perjury the other party in his action against
the witness. Perhaps the preferable method of dealing with the
problem, as in the cases of criminal suits, could not be allowed for
reasons of the efficiency of judicial administration in cases of civil
suits, which tend to be more complicated and drawn out.
The next topic to be considered is the mode of examination.
The witness is to be examined in court by a judge. Since the argument and exceptions to the evidence take place at a later time, and
since the witness can be examined several times, it can be inferred
that the testimony was written down in the form of a deposition.
Also the language about the publication of the evidence strongly
suggests a written deposition.
Usually the same judge who will eventually decide the case
hears the witnesses. However, there are several exceptions to this
rule, and in certain special cases the judge sends out one of his
subordinate officers to take the deposition of a witness. This is done
where the testimony of a bishop is needed, out of respect for his
sacerdotal dignity. Also the fairer sex are allowed to give evidence
by means of depositions taken in their own homes. This deference
to feminine delicacy was taken from a very adamant Roman order.
If a witness is too ill or feeble to be brought to court, then
his deposition can be taken at his home. And if a witness resides
in another jurisdiction, his deposition can be taken before certain
officials in that jurisdiction and sent back to the judge before whom
the action is pending. There must have been a commission under
seal and notice to adverse parties; the judgment must be rendered
by the judge in whose court the proceedings were initiated; and
this is allowed only in civil cases.
Witnesses are to be examined in the presence of both parties.
However, if one party having been given due notice refuses to
appear, then he is estopped to object to any of the questions or
responses or to the ex parte nature of the proceedings. A party will
not be permitted to deprive his opponent of the use of evidence by
merely refusing to be present at the examination of witnesses.
Any person who is not forbidden or excused from testifying
may be compelled to come to court and give evidence. We have
already discussed those persons who are forbidden or incompetent
to testify; so now let us turn to those who are excused from giving
testimony if they do not care to.
No person can be compelled to testify against his immediate
family if he is unwilling. This rule states the privilege of the wit-
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ness not the party. It lists the most distant kin covered by the exemption and then includes all those related in any nearer degree;
since fathers-in-law and sons-in-law are listed, then wives must be
included in this privilege.
Furthermore, old persons, invalids, soldiers, and magistrates
absent on official business have the privilege of refusing to testify,
if they wish to shirk their duties towards the administration of
justice.
Before testifying the prospective witness should be sworn;
the substance of his oath should be that he will tell the truth and
not testify because of partiality or hatred towards any party or
through fear or because of any remuneration. He also should swear
that what he would testify to was told to him by his ancestor;" I
assume that this part of the oath refers only to matters beyond his
own percipiency. It is clear that a witness is to be impartial in his
testimony and not the flaming partisan of the party who produced
him.
The judge is empowered to punish persons who have committed
perjury, according to the nature of the offense.
Usually the competency of a proposed witness is determined before he is sworn, but Ricardus mentions two situations in which
the evidence is taken under reservation. In the first situation, if
the witness can later prove that he is not a slave as asserted by the
other party, then his testimony will be allowed. In the second, the
evidence of a witness who has a civil suit pending against the other
party may be taken and held in abeyance until his said suit has
been concluded. 6 These rules undoubtedly saved time and expense of
the parties, the witnesses, and the courL
In civil cases, if it were necessary, a witness could give his
testimony in camera in order to protect his rights.
The general rule is that witnesses can be examined only three
times before publication of their testimony; they cannot be brought
back after publication except on new articles, i.e. set of questions.
However, they can be brought in a fourth time or after publication,
if a party objects to the evidence as improper or incomplete or if
the other party has made an objection after the third time. It
should be noted that the party producing the same person a fourth
time must give an oath that he has not suppressed evidence or acted
deceitfully but that he has not been able to use the evidence already
5 Cf. the oath of the demandant in reference to his champion in an
action of right: Glanvill II, 3.
G See supra.
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given. No fourth production will be allowed after a long interval;
the parties will not be allowed to protract the litigation unnecessarily; it is the judge's responsibility to see that justice is administered as expeditiously as possible. Thus after a witness has completed testifying and after his testimony has been published and
made available to the parties, both parties have the right to object
to it and recall the witness, if the judge finds defects or incompleteness in his testimony.
A witness has the right to be reimbursed for his proper expenses, i.e., those incurred by his being required to be present in
court, by the party who summoned him. But, of course, he is not
to accept money to pervert the substance of his testimony.
The third and final section is the substance of the examination, what sort of things the witness should testify about and in
what manner, etc.
The witness should tell the whole truth in his answer but he
should limit his answer to matters which are material to the dispute between the litigants. 'J.'he three citations at the end of the
third paragraph are to three diverse sections of the Corpus Juris
Civilis in which rights of action are restricted in various ways; for
these three sections to be germane and for the entire paragraph to
make any sense, this paragraph must have been intended to refer
to the inadmissibility of immaterial evidence, i.e., evidence tending
to establish a proposition not in issue.
The witness should not only testify to those things of which
he has first-hand knowledge but also to that which he learned from
others. However, he cannot testify as to what he has been told by
the plaintiff or whatever the defendant has told him after the litiscontestation. This is a reasonable restriction on the general admission of hearsay evidence; there is no reason to allow the parties
to testify indirectly through their witnesses and thereby swell the
record wtih a glut of self-serving verbiage. It seems to me strange
that the defendant is allowed to thus "educate" his witnesses up
to the time of the litiscontestation, for surely he would be well
aware of the issues to be determined long before this point has
been reached.
A party cannot prove a point by the evidence of a single witness; there must be at least two, but two is sufficient, and the inference is that no more should be produced. The judge should not
be· burdened by evidence which is merely cumulative.
The witness should answer clearly, simply, without qualifications, without embellishment.
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Having considered the rules of evidence set out by Ricardus,
it remains for us to examine these rules by comparison with current American ideas and practices in order to determine which ones
have eternal validity and universal application and which ones were
made to suit local conditions and attitudes which change as each
generation rebels against its predecessor. The times are constantly
changing, and some rules follow the times, others do not. This
essay is centered around Ricardus' summa, and so it is unnecessary
to mention those rules of evidence not discussed therein. And one
further point-it is not necessary to discuss the relative functions
of the judge and jury since there was no jury in Romano-canonical procedure.
In the area of the qualifications of the competent witness there
has been reform of the magnitude approaching revolution. Ricardus mentions as criteria for competency good reputation, education,
personal bias for or against one of the parties for various reasons,
demeanor, inconsistency on voir dire, professional bias, social
status, wealth, domicil, etc. These situations and conditions are still
today recognized as relevant to the likelihood of truthful testimony; however, instead of going to the initial question of competency, these are matters of credibility and weight of the evidence
which are to be dealt with in the final argument or summation to
the jury.
The only type of restriction mentioned by Ricardus which
exists today is the privilege of spouse not to testify against spouse
in a criminal prosecution unless both are willing that the testimony should be given. 7 The reason that this rule has been retained
is not because of any probability of perjury but because it is good
public policy to protect marital relationships by not subjecting them
to this situation which suborns the loyalty of the spouse. 8
The present practices of allowing persons in these various
relationships and situations to testify are good. Many have misgivings as to the abilities of juries to winnow the evidence, but it
is my opinion that in the stiff breeze of the summation the chaff
will be quite blown away. The reason behind the restrictive rules of
the Romano-canonical procedure, to prevent anticipated perjury, is
not great enough to outweigh the general policy of broad admissibility, which was recognized then as now. Clearly the medicine
is worse than the illness.
7 CODE OF VA., sec. 8-287 (repl. vol. 1957), sec. 8-288 (cum. supp.
1966).
s But see contra 2 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 600-604 (3rd ed., 1940)
and 8 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2227, 2228 (rev., 1961).
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The next topic to be considered is the mode of examination.
In the Romano-canonical system the general modus operandi was
for the judge to question the witness upon interrogatories prepared
by the parties. The responses of the witness were written down as
a deposition; then at a later stage of the litigation, after publication, the parties could argue any exceptions. The most significant
thing here is that the depositions were taken before the judge who
would decide the case so that he had the benefit of demeanor evidence, the lack of which was one of the great criticisms of the
process of taking eviden~e in chancery. Today most evidence is
given orally in court in the presence of the judge and jury and more
and more frequently in chancery also. But today when depositions
are used in any court, the demeanor evidence is lost because they
are now taken by the attorneys of the parties; the only court official
present is the reporter, who passively records the proceedings.
The general rule in canon law was that the witnesses were
brought to the judge; however, there were appropriate exceptions
where this rule would consistently involve hardship, and examiners
would be sent out to bishops, women, and invalids. Today we no
longer grant this favor to the first two classes, but of course the
necessity of using the depositions of invalids continues. If the
parties cannot go to his bedside, then his testimony will be lost.
As mentioned above, the examination is conducted by the attorneys,
therefore examiners are no longer needed or used.
Then as now, if a witness resides outside of the jurisdiction
of the court, his deposition may be taken where he resides and returned to the court in which the lawsuit is pending. In this case it
is felt that the convenience to the witness and the reduction of
expense to the parties outweighs the value of the demeanor evidence. Today it is not necessary to have a commission to take a
deposition.
Although at canon law magistrates, soldiers, and invalids had
the privilege not to testify at all if they did not care to, under the
current system they do not enjoy this privilege. However, the
depositions of certain public officials can be used more freely than
those of the ordinary garden-variety people. Their depositions can
be taken at a time and place that will not seriously inconvenience
them; the time and place can be set to suit them, since the judge
need not be present. If the judge is required to be on hand, as in
the canon law procedure, then everyone else's schedule must be
conformed to his. The principle behind these rules is that the performance of public duties of important officials should not be impaired by requiring these men to spend their time in court in
matters which do not concern the state.
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In both systems the effective administration of justice has
shown that the witnesses must be able to be compelled to testify
and to testify under oath and to be punished for perjury. Both parties should be present at the giving of testimony; however, if due
notice has been given, the other party is estopped to object to an
ex parte proceeding. This makes the availability of cross-interrogatories meaningful.
As to the amount of testimony, Ricardus infers that three
productions of a witness is the normal limit; this would allow for
a cross-examination and a re-direct as in our current practice in
the court room. In taking depositions today, there is no limit on
the number of times a witness can be compelled to depose; however,
since the attorneys now ask the questions and cross-examine at the
end of the direct examination, it is seldom more than one. The judge
has full power to remedy the abusive use of depositions in any case.
Ricard us also admits that interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium.
In Romano-canonical law, the witness had the right to reimbursement of his expenses in connection with his giving testimony.
He does not have this right in our system; however, as a general
rule, the party that produced him will repay him for his expenses.
Modern judges have no trouble distinguishing these payments
from bribes. After all he usually has no personal interest in the
suit; if others benefit from his efforts and time, they should pay
for it.
In both systems the testimony is limited by the conception of
materiality; it is too obvious to mention that a lawsuit must have
some sort of boundary.
The canon law courts allowed the witnesses to give hearsay
evidence. The reasons we today do not allow it is that a jury is not
felt to be able to cope with it as well as a judge, but principally
because of the modern emphasis on the importance of cross-examination. However, the innumerable modern exceptions to the hearsay rule indicate that its original purpose was to exclude evidence
which was of lesser value, and at the same time these exceptions
suggest that the rule is not a foreordained, immutable decree of the
Fates.
The refusal of the canonists to accept the uncorroborated
testimony of a single witness ill a precaution which is not found
in Anglo-American law. It would appear obvious to us that one
witness is better than none and that lack of corroboration is a
question of weight rather than competency, but it is not to the
civilians.
Both systems attempt to expedite the course of the trial by
discouraging the production of witnesses whose testimony is un-
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necessarily cumulative and by encouraging witnesses to testify
clearly and directly.
In all that has gone before, we have been examining various
rules of evidence to determine their efficacy in bringing the true
facts before the court and in keeping from the ears of the court
lies, misstatements, and exaggerations. The success of these rules
along these lines is absolutely essential to the cause of justice. If
the rules of evidence do not perform their functions, then the court
is a travesty. The courts should be accessible to all persons, and
thus the rules of evidence should promote the efficient and inexpensive use of witnesses. What good is a court, if it is so clogged
with business that it cannot hear your case or if it is so expensive
that you cannot afford to appear in it? In pursuing these goals, it
is well to keep in mind the principles, purposes, and experiences of
other systems, especially the more advanced ones, such as the canon
and civil laws, upon which we have leaned heavily in the past.

